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That the brain matches its environment is no more surprising than the 
matching of the two ends of a broken stick. 
 
W. Ross Ashby1 
 
 
First of all, heartfelt thanks to Liz Irvine, Matteo Colombo, and Margarita 
(Mog) Stapleton: thanks for coming up with the idea of this volume, and for 
somehow making it actually happen. How on earth they persuaded such an 
amazing set of folk to contribute is quite beyond me. But I want to take this 
opportunity to thank them – and all my colleagues and students over an 
embarrassingly large number of years – for teaching me so much, and for 
introducing me to so many of the ideas that I have come to value and embrace.  
 
My debts to Daniel Dennett, who so graciously contributed the Foreword, are 
incalculable. Dan is a lifelong friend, and the major inspiration for all my work. 
I am also hugely and at times painfully indebted to the many contributors to 
this volume.  
 
Hugely, because these essays shed new and important light on so many topics 
dear to my heart – topics that may prove to be crucial anchor points for the 
future sciences of the mind, or just passing fancies that appear and dissolve like 
smoke-streams over a fire.  Whatever the outcomes, I have never had so much 
fun, or learned quite so much, from reading a group of essays before. This is 
testimony, surely, to the way so many of the contributors managed to draw 
links between new and exciting developments in their own specialist areas and 
core and recurring themes in my work.  
 
But painfully too, because along the way they reveal enough flaws, omissions, 
and apparent inconsistencies to keep me busy for many years to come. The 
pain and the gain are, perhaps inevitably, linked. The essays forced me to think 
harder than ever about how (if at all) the various strands in my work hang 
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together. Is there one picture here or many? What, if anything, holds it all 
together? Can I really have that many cakes and eat them all? Never one to fear 
bloat, I’m going to try. 
 
I’ve kept the structure plain and simple. I respond briefly to each essay in turn, 
in a way that (or so I fondly hope) unfolds as a single, not wildly inconsistent, 
narrative. It’s a narrative that takes us all the way from EEE (Embodied, 
Extended, Enactive) Cognition to EEE-P Cognition – the same core dishes, 
served up with a satisfying Predictive twist. 
 
 
Part 1: Extensions and Alterations 
 
The volume kicks off, appropriately enough, with an important new 
contribution from my partner-in-extended-crime, David Chalmers. Chalmers 
has the singular honor of being both a thoughtful defender and an incisive 
critic of the core arguments meant to establish that minds (human minds, as 
they currently exist) can sometimes extend – where that means that bio-
external structures and operations become poised and woven so as to become 
parts of the physical machinery of thinking. In the new paper, he takes careful 
aim at the thesis itself, seeking a statement of the view that is neither too weak 
to be interesting nor too strong to be plausible. In so doing, he puts his finger 
on something that has bothered me for a long time. 
 
Way back when, Daniel Dennett described a thought experiment in which a 
human brain was removed from the gross body, and kept in a distant location 
while controlling the body from afar. We might think of this, Dennett (1978, 
p.311) wrote “as a mere stretching of the nerves. If your brain were moved an 
inch over in your skull, that would not alter or impair your mind. We’re simply 
going to make the nerves indefinitely elastic by splicing radio links into them”. I 
have sometimes wondered whether such a scenario might be taken to establish 
the basic space for extended minds. The story shows that we should not be too 
impressed, where the machinery of minds are concerned, by the typical spatial 
location of brains within the bodily bounds. But at the same time (modulo very 
reasonable worries about time delays) there is really nothing here to challenge 
standard internalist initutions. Dennett’s protagonist sports a mind whose core 
physical machinery lies clearly outside the head, but that kind of mere re-
location seems deeply different to the kinds of extension defended and 
contested in work on the extended mind. Similarly, replacing a neuron with a 
radio-communicating silicon chip located outside the head seems to offer (as 
noted by Farkas (2012)) too weak an argument2. 
	   3	  
 
Chalmers’ contribution makes clear why this should be so. The interesting 
thesis at issue is not that sometimes some of the machinery of mind can (in this 
very world) be located beyond the bounds of skin and skull. That sets the bar 
too low. Rather, the substantive claim is that some of the machinery of mind 
can safely be located beyond the intuitive bounds of perception and action.  
Slightly more generally, Chalmers suggests, this could be re-cast as allowing 
select neuro-external operations to count despite sensory and motor 
interactions playing a key role in enabling them to become woven into an 
extended circuit.  
 
In other words, the claim is that just because some external resource (such as 
Otto’s notebook) is subject to sensorimotor engagements, that does not erect a 
barrier such that all the genuinely mental activity needs to be assigned only to 
the ‘filling’ in the resulting sensorimotor sandwich. Chalmers invites me to sign 
up for something like this as the new official statement of the core thesis. I 
hereby do so, and dub it – at least for the purposes of this Reply -  the 
‘sensorimotor liberation’ story. I think it is correct, but want to float a few 
questions and caveats. 
 
A potential concern is that the sensorimotor version positively invites the 
intervention of full-blown agentive attention within allegedly mind-extending 
processing loops. It does so because perception-action loops are often 
characterized by careful distributions of agentive attention, as when I carefully 
pour the rice from the packet into the narrow-necked rice jar. This can seem 
problematic, since there is a natural tendency to think that attention always 
relates a cognitive agent to some agent-external state of affairs, selecting some 
aspects of that state of affairs for further or more fine-grained processing. If we 
accept such a picture, then the intervention of full-blown agentive attention, 
within a perception-action cycle, seems to work (and see Clark (2015) for 
further discussion) against the picture of an extended cognitive process. Instead, 
we seem to confront a purely internal cognitive process modified by some 
external object, encoding, or state of affairs. It was to avoid this kind of worry 
that Clark and Chalmers (and then Clark (2008)) often insisted that the loopy 
processing be so fluent as to become almost sub-personal in nature. 
 
The simple remedy, I think, is to notice that agentive attention can already 
safely intervene in purely internal processes of imagination and reasoning. Thus 
suppose I am wondering about the shape of someone’s moustache. I call up a 
mental image and attend to the shape of the moustache. In such cases, we are 
not tempted to think of the attended information as thereby being pushed 
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outside the ‘bounds of cognition’ (to borrow a phrase from Adams and Aizawa 
(2001)). In the case of the moustache, I may need to attend quite carefully to 
my recalled image, and even then I may end up with an uncertain (hence not 
fully trusted) verdict. Yet this seems in no way to work against the intuitive 
view that that kind of fully inner episode is a proper part of my cognitive 
processing. Since we surely ought not hold extended systems to higher 
standards than classically inner ones, the moral is that the intervention of full-
blown agentive attention is not, after all, inconsistent with the presence of 
extended cognitive processes partly constituted by the attended materials 
themselves. 
 
Chalmers ends by leveraging the ‘sensorimotor interaction’ considerations so as 
to suggest a new reason for what many see as the uncomfortable view that the 
machinery of consciousness is ‘in the head’ even though the machinery of mind 
extends. The reason for the asymmetry, Chalmers speculates, may be to do 
with the ties between conscious experience and the ‘direct availability’ of 
information for global control. Loops through perception and action introduce 
way-stations such that information, while out in the loop, is not directly poised 
for global control. This is a fascinating idea, but one that needs a lot more 
development and clarification if it is to be convincing. Why, for example, 
couldn’t currently foveated information (such as an inscription in Otto’s 
notebook) count as directly poised? I share Dave’s intuition here, but slightly 
longer travel routes for such signals, since they are delivered at the speed of 
light, do not introduce appreciable delays, so do not seem to introduce any kind 
of functionally relevant indirectness. Indeed, as long ago as 1972 Newell and 
Simon commented that “from a functional viewpoint, the STM should be 
defined not as an internal memory but as the combination of (1) the internal 
STM and (2) the part of the visual display that is in the subject’s foveal view”. 
So I think the jury remains out. It would be deeply satisfying (to me) if the 
‘sensorimotor liberation’ rendition of the core extended mind thesis 
simultaneously revealed why extended consciousness is not currently actual and 
perhaps not humanly possible, but I am not yet convinced it does so. 
 
Nor, with bells on, is Fred Adams. Adams is a long-time sceptic both about 
extended consciousness and about the arguments meant to lead us to embrace 
extended (non-conscious) cognition. In his characteristically friendly and 
forceful piece, Adams asks me to come clean on a number of issues. First and 
foremost he (still) wants me to offer a ‘mark of the cognitive’ – an account, 
which need not amount to a concise definition, of what makes it the case that 
something counts as a cognitive process at all. I have resisted this pressure on 
the grounds that no such account is likely to command general assent, and 
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because we do seem to have at least an intuitive grip on the realm of the 
cognitive – enough of a grip to see, for example, that digestion and 
photosynthesis are not cognitive processes, while in-the-head planning and 
episodic memory most certainly are.  This is presumably because planning and 
episodic memory involve the repeated encoding and transformation of 
information into forms apt for the guidance of rational action and flexible, 
informed, response. This kind of rough informal grip is, I claim, is all we need 
to raise the question whether cognitive processes sometimes extend – a 
question whose answer will then help us further refine and understand the 
realm of the cognitive. All the old devices (most notably the parity principle 
that invites us to apply our informal understanding without the distractions of 
skin and skull) are apt for argumentative use given this rough and ready base 
understanding. So I continue to reject Adams’ demand. 
 
Do I therefore believe that there simply is no ‘mark of the cognitive’? Adams 
notes that if that means there will be no principled way of ever saying of some 
X that X is or is not a cognitive process, that would make the very thesis of 
extended cognition elusive and perhaps uninteresting. But we are not working 
in a vacuum here – any more than moral theorists were working in a vacuum 
when asked to think about acceptable social orders without letting their own 
place in society influence their choices. Instead, the idea is that we discover 
how best to think about the realm of the cognitive by first liberating ourselves 
from a certain image of the mind as a kind of ethereal filler in a perception-
action sandwich. We are then free to see it instead as a potentially looping 
process that underpins choice and action in ways that are distinctively cognitive 
in that they are delicately sensitive to new worldly information, and put it 
flexibly to use in the service of our changing goals and needs.  
 
Adams also presses me on some passages where I suggest that cognition is to 
be judged more by its  ‘effects’ than by ‘causes’, fearing that this hints at a kind 
of simple behaviorism that trivializes the suggestion that cognitive processes 
extend. But I didn’t mean to imply that wordly behaviors might count as partly 
implementing a cognitive process totally irrespective of inner causes. The shape 
and nature of the inner parts of looping processes matter, and may be essential 
to the whole process counting as a cognitive process. Assuming any such 
constraints are met, the ‘right kind of causes’ – as Adams himself notes at the 
start of section VI - can then come to include whole perception-action loops, 
and need not be limited to the neuro-internal aspects of such loops. Counting 
on our fingers, or gesturing as part of thinking, are offered as cases like this.  
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Does Notto – the conjoined twin who Adams neatly imagines to play the role 
of Otto’s notebook – constitute a reductio of the view that some of Otto’s 
cognitive processes extend via the notebook? I don’t think so. The oddity here 
is that Notto is a fully-fledged agent. But all that means is that two systems here 
know the location of MOMA – Notto (qua self-standing mind) and Otto, some 
of whose processing enloops Notto via sensorimotor means3.  
 
On a more positive note, Adams suggests that cognition “involves mental 
structures that rise from the level of information only to the level of meaning”.  
I think that’s right. Cognitive processes are information-transformers, that take 
energetic inputs and amplify, sculpt, and select them so as flexibly to serve an 
organism’s context-dependent needs and purposes. A good way to think of the 
extended mind arguments is thus to see them as a way of recognizing the 
extraordinary extent to which those very processes of selecting, sculpting, and 
amplifying are realized not only by transformations carried out within the 
brain/CNS, but by the use of a huge range of ‘epistemic actions’ that likewise 
select, alter, and amplify energetic signals so as flexibly to serve our context-
varying needs and purposes. 
 
At this point, (certain) behaviors and cognitive processes partly coincide. But 
this does not mean that cognitive processes are simply identical with behavior. 
This, as Ken Aizawa also argues, would simply trivialize the extended mind 
claim itself. Instead, the message is that starting only from our intuitive grip on 
the realm of the cognitive, we can see (once a few skin and skull prejudices are 
cleared away) that many aspects of behavior, and the bio-external structures 
and operations that sensorimotor loops thereby poise for use, look much more 
aspects of the cognizing itself than like instrumental or pragmatic outflows 
from some purely inner cognitive machine. Where these overlaps occur, 
sensorimotor loops are not merely ‘causal support’ but help constitute the 
process as one that sculpts, selects, and transforms energetic information in 
ways that make it fit to serve our purposes.  
 
In sum, I completely agree with both Aizawa and Adams’ general insistence 
that cognition is not the same thing as behavior. As Aizawa points out, it is 
pretty darned obvious that behavior ‘extends’, and that cognition is meant to be 
something distinct – something like a certain kind of well-spring from which 
pragmatic behaviors might issue. But this is perfectly consistent with the idea 
that sometimes, some aspects of behavior are playing a recognizably cognitive role. 
That is the heart and soul of what I am calling Chalmer’s ‘sensorimotor 
liberation’ version of the thesis of extended cognition. To insist that ‘if it is 
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behavior it isn’t (also) implementing a cognitive process’ is simply to beg the 
question against the thesis of cognitive extension thus understood. 
 
Aizawa also uses the cognition/behavior divide as a pivot for some rich and 
challenging reactions to my suggestion that public language is itself a kind of 
semi-external cognitive resource.  The picture he offers is one in which 
utterances and texts help us do things we couldn’t otherwise do – such as teach 
and learn advanced philosophy! But they do this, he argues, only by triggering 
thoughts ‘in the head’, leaving all the truly cognitive activity on the inside of the 
familiar inner-outer divide. There is no doubt that this is the standard picture, 
and that it allows the presence of public language to alter what inner cognition 
can achieve. Linguistic behavior is indeed behavior – so once again, the 
interesting claim is that some aspects of that behavior might also count as 
implementing genuinely cognitive processes – ones that would simply not exist 
were the external symbolic realm not available. Here, I direct the reader to 
Mike Wheeler’s (this volume) discussion of how a connectionist pattern-
completer, when coupled with structured external symbolic inscriptions, might 
implement a distinctively cognitive device – a distributed version of a ‘physical 
symbol system’ as described by Newell and Simon. This is an excellent example, 
since PSS’s have distinctive computational properties (such as supporting 
symbol re-combination and ‘systematicity’) that seem extremely relevant to 
fixing the cognitive profile of an agent.  
 
To be sure, a determined critic may still insist that only the inner elements of 
the processing loops here count as ‘cognitive’. But this is at most a stalemate, 
since it is unclear what (apart from the in-the-head intuitions at issue) mandates 
such a view. The alternative picture is one in which some of the properties of 
the external medium count, despite their reliance upon sensorimotor loops, as 
helping to constitute the cognitive profile of the agent.  
 
It is intriguing to note that a whole class of DeepMind systems (called 
‘Differentiable Neural Computers4 ’ or DNCs) fit exactly this profile, consisting 
of deep learning networks that have learnt to use read-write operations to 
couple their own internal processing capacities to stable yet modifiable external 
data stores so as to deliver brand new kinds of functionality. In this way, DNCs  
“combine the advantages of neural and computational processing by providing 
a neural network with read–write access to external memory…minimizing 
interference among memoranda and enabling long-term storage”. As a result, 
DNCs “have the capacity to solve complex, structured tasks that are 
inaccessible to neural networks without external read–write memory” (both 
quotes from Graves et al (2016) p. 1). In short, these systems can learn to 
	   8	  
represent and reason about complex structures – such as the London 
Underground system - in ways that the non-externally-augmented network 
cannot.  
 
Differentiable Neural Computers are nice examples of the power of a 
(stripped-down) version of ‘sensorimotor liberation’. They use external 
memory resources which they can couple with only via attentional read-write 
processes. These loops into external media transform the space of problems 
they are able to solve, delivering behavioral capacities that one would normally 
expect only from more classically structured problem-solving engines. I think it 
is at least prima facie plausible to suggest that these systems exemplify, in a 
minimal but revealing fashion, the way that operations made available only via 
sensorimotor loops might nonetheless help constitute the computational form 
of an embodied cognitive system. Loops like these do not merely provide 
triggers for inner (truly ‘cognitive’) operations, but look (to me) to be the 
material underpinnings of an extended computational process. The inner and 
the outer here combine in the kind of way that, in the works on language that 
Aizawa interrogates, I dub ‘complementarity’ rather than ‘translation’.  
 
Aizawa is right to note that one could, nonetheless, insist that the external stuff 
only does its work by having the right kinds of effect on the inner stuff. But 
that alone cannot make it correct to treat the inner as simply a translation of 
the outer. For a translation ought to have the same semantically significant 
properties as that which it translates. But here, structure-sensitive learning and 
reasoning depend crucially upon the persisting, stable, re-inspectable external 
store. This looks more like a distribution of cognitive labour than a simple 
triggering relation. Agree or disagree, I hope that the intended content of the  
‘complementarity’ model of the role of public language is now a little easier to 
see. Of course, the real-world case (unlike the DeepMind system) is one in 
which advanced agents then come to internalize many of the initially 
distributed operations, making the best diagnosis less clear. For that reason, I 
have always thought that self-directed and self-deployed language offers an 
interesting kind of borderline case – a ‘transition technology’, perhaps, on our 
socio-historical path to instantiating  truly extended minds. 
 
Aizawa also questions my suggestion that public language provides a kind of  
‘cognitive tool’ that helps us think about thinking itself. He notes that some 
language-less humans seem to have done quite well at thinking about their own 
thoughts, as shown by what they say at a later time. This is a fair challenge, and 
it seems very likely that simple second-order cognitive dynamics can exist 
without language. Language, however, may greatly enhance and extend such 
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capacities, enabling us to construct and comprehend chains of spiraling self-
reflection that would otherwise defeat us. 
 
Katalin Farkas illuminatingly takes up the theme of the ‘extended conscious 
mind’ (ECM) arguing that resistance to ECM is inconsistent with some of my 
own putative examples of extended cognition. Specifically, both the Tetris 
example (from the original paper) and the Ballard blocks-copying example 
(from Clark (2008a)) seem to involve events that are ‘part of the stream of 
consciousness’ – unlike the merely standing beliefs of Otto. However, a 
conscious moment can be part of an extended mental process even if the 
conscious moment itself is wholly internally supported – such, roughly 
speaking, was the intended upshot of the Tetris and Ballard cases.  
 
Still, it seems fair to ask why the cake be thus carved. It is not (for me or, I 
think, for Chalmers) because conscious processing resists functional 
specification. Rather, it is because – for whatever reason - inner processing 
seems sufficient to deliver the conscious state at every moment. Conscious 
experiences of the Tetris screen might thus all be constructed ‘in the head’ (just 
as Farkas, in section 5, insists). So what remains to count as an extended 
cognitive process? The idea was that those conscious moments, internally 
constructed, are part of larger, extended, genuinely cognitive  processes. For 
example, to get the right conscious state at the right moment, certain loops into 
the world (for example, manipulating the zoids so as to aid identification) may 
play a crucial role. Indeed, I would expect that a lot of the relevant Tetris-
playing actions are launched and initiated without conscious involvement at all! 
In any case (to take up the kind of story about conscious experience suggested 
by Chalmers in his contribution) we must surely allow that non-conscious inner 
processing can play a crucial role in the run-up that poises information directly 
for the global control of action and reason. But then by the same token, there is 
no reason why (if the extended mind arguments are on track) non-conscious 
elements of the bio-external flow cannot play the same kind of role. In each 
case a behavior (zoid placement) may be proximally caused by the conscious 
state, even though that state arises as part of a process that may potentially 
extend, and that is not to be identified with its conscious moments alone. I 
recognize, however, that treating conscious experience as a succession of 
‘moments’, rather than a rolling process, seems deeply wrong (and see Clark 
(2009b)). As a result I am increasingly open to the idea of cognitive extension 
for at least some conscious states.  
 
Farkas is exactly right to insist that cases of simple ‘external re-routing’ (or 
‘cognitive prosthesis’) are not properly speaking cases of extended cognitive 
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processes. Such cases (which would include the ‘mere stretching of the nerves’ 
imagined by Dennett) are at best useful softeners, reminding us that location is 
not functionally essential to any computational process. But they are not 
exemplars of the kind of deep conceptual challenge attempted by core 
arguments for the extended mind. The difference, as Chalmers (this volume) 
rightly suggests, is that the core arguments all seek to establish the real-world 
possibility of cognitive extensions that involve bio-external operations made 
available via sensorimotor loops. 
 
Michelle Maiese usefully canvasses a number of reasons to doubt that affective 
states extend. Her principal target is work by Colombetti and Roberts (2015). 
Here, I tend to agree (though with increasing uncertainty – see above) with the 
general conclusion, but was unconvinced by the argumentative route on offer. 
Maiese (this volume, ms page 5) suggests that “crucial structural aspects of 
emotion –such as its egocentric, spatial, and temporal dimensions—are 
physically grounded in the neurobiological dynamics of living organisms… and 
[that] this lends support to the thesis that emotional consciousness is 
constitutively dependent on our living bodies”. But this is in tension, she argues, 
with appeals to arguments for the extended mind insofar as they imply belief in 
the thesis of multiple realizability, and thus allow that an a bodiless brain-in-a-
vat could enjoy all the same experiences as we do. The idea is thus that 
Colombetti and Roberts ought not to make their case for extended affect by 
appeal to (versions of) arguments for the extended mind.  
 
I want to resist the suggestion that accepting a brain-in-a-vat (BIV) scenario 
implies that “the specific details of human embodiment would play no essential 
role in cognition” and that a bodiless being might enjoy all the same mental 
states as we do. I resist this because I do not believe the BIV agents to be 
bodiless at all! Following Chalmers (2005) it seems to me that the BIV picture 
is best understood as one in which the body itself, with all its cognitively 
relevant physical idiosyncrasies, is alternatively ‘deep physically realized’! BIV 
agents, on this view, are as genuinely embodied as you and I, and their bodies 
have specific, potentially cognitively-relevant, forms (see Clark (2005), (2008a)).  
It is just that the deep physical bedrock of those bodily forms is not quite as we 
normally imagine it to be.  
 
Let’s call this kind of alternative deep physics ‘alt-physics’.  Next, consider that 
the BIV agent, despite her realization in alt-physics, may still count on her 
fingers, and will be as impacted as we are by the number of fingers readily 
available. Like us, she will exhibit (Maiese ms p.5) “racing hearts, quickened 
breathing, grimacing faces, tensing muscles, tingling skin, and sweating palms” 
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as well as “alterations in skin conductance, cardio-pulmonary changes, and 
musculoskeletal changes”.  She may also leave sticky notes on her desk, and 
these will be subject to the same disruptive physical forces (wind, rain, other 
agents) as when realized by more ‘standard’ means.  
 
All this is consistent with my view (more on which below) that sometimes, the 
very same mental state might exist in differently embodied or embedded agents 
thanks to some compensatory adjustments in the distribution of labor between 
body and world. To see this, notice that such cases would themselves be apt for 
full re-creation using ‘alt-physics’ as the bedrock. In such a case there would be 
two differently alt-embodied but mentally identical agents realized using alt-
physics. Bodily differences, though often cognitively relevant, need not always 
be. Bodily difference often matters, and it often makes a cognitive difference. 
But bodily difference is not sufficient (see Clark (2008b)) for mental or 
cognitive difference. Alt-physics, on the other hand, is not cognitively relevant 
at all. 
 
These themes also animate Larry Shapiro’s lively and compelling exploration 
of the various ways that embodiment might matter for mind. Shapiro resists my 
(2008b) arguments supposed to favour a ‘larger mechanism’ account of 
extended cognition over a ‘special contribution’ account. ‘Larger mechanism’ 
(LM) stories would include the kind of case mentioned above, where differing 
bodily forms share mental states in virtue of compensatory adjustments in the 
overall balance between bodily, neural, and worldly contributions. ‘Special 
mechanism’ (SM) stories stress the many unexpected ways in which specific 
details of embodiment impact mental states.  
 
Shapiro agrees that sometimes, compensatory adjustments might occur, and 
that the LM (larger mechanism) story is viable. Differently embodied beings, 
when viewed through  ‘psych-goggles’ – imaginary spectacles that “filter from 
view everything but computational structure”  – might thus look exactly the 
same. But he thinks that SM is more interesting for psychology and cognitive 
science, and that LM (as neatly dramatized by the psych-goggles) even 
threatens to blind us to the importance of real human bodies for human mental 
states.  
 
Shapiro’s example concerns the way right- and left- handed people differ in 
some judgments, tending (after controlling for content) to positively favour 
options and choices whose descriptions are presented on the dominant side – 
on the right, for right handers, the left for left handers. Commenting on this 
result, Shapiro suggests that whereas LM might here reveal a computational 
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commonality, SC would reveal “why, because of their differences, right- and 
left-handers will display differences in their cognitive propensities.” Shapiro 
glosses this by saying that “the focus of SC is squarely on cognition, not 
implementation, and the role of the body in shaping or informing cognition”. 
 
LM thus threatens to focus attention away from the very stuff (the body and 
world) that it seeks to celebrate! SM, by contrast, is free to revel in the many 
ways embodiment ‘permeates psychology’. However, I think this is a false 
choice. Rather than thinking simply in terms of a ‘level of algorithm’ and a 
‘level of implementation’, we do better to think of many levels such that what is 
psychologically interesting varies with explanatory project. For example, there 
are various algorithms that sort numbers into order. For some purposes, the 
differences don’t matter. For others (e.g. understanding the relative time it 
takes to carry out different sized sorts) they matter a lot. Similarly, I do not 
think there is a single ‘level’ of description that best serves psychology. In the 
end, my arguments for LM are perhaps best seen in that light. In the case of the 
right and left handers, there is a psychological profile that differs and one that 
does not. Both – just as Shapiro himself ends by suggesting – are important if 
we are to unravel the importance of embodiment to the human mind.  
 
Mike Wheeler addresses core issues concerning how best to argue for the 
extended mind. Like Fred Adams, Wheeler believes that extended mind 
debates should revolve around some agreed  ‘mark of the mental’. His 
arguments fit neatly with our earlier discussion of Differentiable Neural 
Computers. Briefly put, the suggestion is that appeals to hybrid connectionist 
systems that also manipulate external symbols (as discussed by Bechtel (1994, 
1996)) or to Differentiable Neural Computers (in contemporary work on Deep 
Learning) will tend to favor a ‘merely embedded’ rather than a truly extended 
picture. This is because the ‘rough folk intuitions’ that I myself appeal include 
(Wheeler argues) the intuition that the real machinery of mind is in the head. 
The way out, he suggests, is to start instead with the principled appeal to an 
independently motivated mark of the cognitive, such as might be provided by 
Newell and Simon’s Physical Symbol System Hypothesis (PSS). For it is visibly 
the case that it is only the combined inner/outer machinery that (in the cases 
just mentioned) provides for the kinds of operations upon stable chunky 
symbols that PSS itself requires. Complementarity of the inner and outer 
contributions here ensures that the hybrid inner-outer system itself is the  
organization that displays the mark of the cognitive. 
 
Wheeler is right that IF processing in accordance with the PSS were accepted, 
in anything like its original form, as a mark of the cognitive, then the extended 
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(but not the non-extended) engines would here qualify. But what this is bound 
to suggest, to e.g. connectionists with more internalist leanings, is simply that 
the PSS is not the mark of the cognitive after all. Most likely, a theorist such as 
Bechtel will simply conclude that something else (powerful pattern-completing 
abilities perhaps) picks out the truly cognitive, with greater behavioral success 
being pressed from those resources by their canny couplings with external 
props and aids. It is for this reason that I still believe that the parity arguments, 
combined with rough folk intuition, are the best way forward. For even if the 
folk tend to think that the cognitive is all in the head, the parity arguments 
invite them to put that element of the folk picture aside and to reconsider their 
own intuitions without that singular distraction. 
 
To be honest, however, I no longer believe that any side can ‘win’ these debates 
concerning productive embedding versus true cognitive extension. Instead, 
what those debates seem to me to have revealed is deep uncertainty or conflict 
within both the folk and cognitive scientific understandings of mind and 
cognition themselves5. It is depressingly clear that a significant part of the 
recent history of Philosophy of Mind and. Cognitive Science has been devoted 
to as-yet-unsolved debates concerning the applicability, or otherwise, of 
standard mental predicates to a variety of systems, organisms and processes. 
Disputed territory includes thermostats (Dennett (1987, 1998)), paramycia 
(Fodor (1986)), language-less animals (McDowell (1994)), ‘swampmen’ 
(Davidson (1987), programs (Searle (1980)), plants (Trewawas (2003), Calvo 
and Friston (2017) and certain forms of putative sub-personal cognitive activity 
(Searle 1992)). What this shows is that there is simply no easy consensus among 
‘suitably trained observers’ (folk or otherwise) concerning the distribution of 
minds and mentality in either our natural or technological worlds. This lack of 
agreement is equally evident in daily life, when one considers debates over 
other animals, fetuses, pre-linguistic infants, some coma patients, and so on. 
Our unresolved collective uncertainties concerning putative cases of cognitive 
extension are perhaps less surprising when seen as part of this larger pattern.  
 
I continue to believe that radical internalism is scientifically unjustified and 
unjustifiable. Yet the radical externalist option (extending the mind by 
sensorimotor means) is inevitably revisionary, and apparently sits ill – just as 
Wheeler argues - with deep folk intuitions concerning the biological ‘innerness’ 
of mind, perhaps due to the proximity of those folk notions of mentality to 
notions of (the machinery of) conscious experience. Despite this standoff, I’m  
optimistic about the overall impact of these debates upon science, philosophy, 
and even, as time goes by, upon common-sense. For what is now very widely 
agreed is that it is the complex weave of inner and outer capacities, tricks, and 
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ploys that together make possible the varieties of human and (other) animal 
thought and adaptive success. Within those weaves, there are myriad previously 
unexpected contributions made, as Shapiro and others suggest, by gross 
physical features and by sensorimotor loops that create and exploit bio-external 
order. Understanding this rich and surprising mosaic, however described, is the 
real task of the sciences of mind and behavior.  
 
 
Part 2: On Being a Cyborg 
 
 
Part 2 opens with a characteristically probing contribution from Louise 
Barrett, pitched from the productive crossroads between anthropology, 
psychology, and (the rest of) cognitive science.  Barrett’s use of work on 
embodied and extended cognition as a route towards a better understanding of 
non-human animals is striking proof of the practical value of these new 
perspectives. Seeing beyond the cognitivist brain-bound paradigm enables us, 
Barrett has argued, to avoid anthropocentrism as we consider other species – it 
invites us to appreciate their kind of cognition, bound up with their kinds of 
bodies and their kinds of environmental niche.  
 
Barrett is unconvinced, however, by my ongoing use of the ‘cognitivist’ 
vocabulary of internal models and representations, action-oriented or otherwise. 
That worry is potentially exacerbated, she notes, by my more recent appeals to 
generative-model based prediction machinery (in the context of work on 
‘Predictive Processing’ or PP for short) as lying at the very core of flexible 
adaptive response in both human and non-human animals. In that work, my 
long-standing use of terms like ‘action-oriented representation’ and ‘internal 
model’ is joined by talk of multi-level probabilistic inference. But is all this 
cognitivist-sounding talk useful or justifiable? The issue is personally pressing, 
since I simultaneously argue (Clark (2016a)) for a somewhat revised 
understanding of all these key terms – one that reveals the prediction engine as 
fundamentally tuned to affordances and geared to the use of body, world, and 
action as means of simplifying inner processing. So why not just swallow the 
ecological medicine and ditch those cognitivist descriptors once and for all, 
replacing them with talk of affordances, tunings, resonances and the like? 
 
There are several reasons (see Clark (2016a)) why I am not (yet) persuaded to 
do so. But most fundamentally it seems to me that doing so obscures useful 
information about what happens during both learning and ongoing response. If 
these stories are correct, learning involves the gradual installation, in the human 
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brain, of a multi-level generative model defined over sensory outcomes. To be 
generative, in this sense, is to be capable of constructing plausible versions of 
those sensory outcomes using prior knowledge  (‘from the top-down’). That 
knowledge ends up being a highly structured resource, that locks on to patterns 
at many scales of space and time, in ways informed by the nesting of actual 
causes in the world.  
 
For example, an action may be predicted both at a gross level (‘get the roasted 
red pepper and hummus sandwich’) and at multiple related lower levels, slowly 
unpacking the goal into a set of smaller action-sequences, that are in turn 
cashed out via predictions about the required states of muscles and tendons. 
Ditto for simply seeing that scene, where predictions about the general nature 
of the setting (‘in a vegetarian-friendly sandwich-bar’) inform predictions about 
the items on offer, that inform predictions about their look, feel, and taste. Not 
only that – the system becomes able to generate all these outcomes in ways that 
must take account of a wide variety of contextual cues, including interoceptive 
cues involving our own bodily states. The generative process is thus delicately 
responsive to inner and outer context, spans perception and action, and is 
defined over a rich space informed by what might most naturally be cast as 
‘representations’ of nesting, interacting worldly and bodily causes operating at 
multiple interlocking scales of space and time.  
 
How should the representational skeptic capture this picture? Bruineberg and 
Rietveld (2014) suggest we speak instead of an system apt to support a good, 
affordance-based ‘grip’ on the world. But I suggest that the most informative 
word remains simply ‘representation’, but now stripped of all connotations 
involving chunky symbolic items of the ‘Language of Thought’ variety. The 
picture of ongoing attempts at prediction as installing a probabilistic generative 
model that represents both actions and states of affairs is simply a way of drawing 
attention to the fact that (1) the generative model is here meant to be a real 
aspect of our cognitive organization (not just a theorist’s fiction), and (2) that it 
is takes the form of a structured and flexible knowledge base, apt for repeated 
redeployment in ways that are appropriately sensitive to new information.  
 
Might we do sufficient justice to the highly structured nature of that 
knowledge-base by describing it simply as being tuned to or resonating to the right 
stuff at the right time? Maybe – if we now understand the notions of resonance 
and tuning as involving the separation of causes into nesting factors operating 
at different but interlocking time-scales, and stress that the resonating reflects 
inner and outer context and is appropriately sensitive, again at multiple time-
scales, to new information. But thus refined these notions of resonance, tuning, 
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and grip look (to me at least) to be just action-oriented representations called 
by another name. Perhaps that means we all agree on the substantial claims 
hereabouts, and can finally call an end (Clark (2015)) to the ‘representation 
wars’?  
 
Barrett also worries that appeals to internal representation make a kind of tacit 
but illegitimate reference to some kind of inner user or interpreter – the rightly-
feared inner homunculus. However, the cognitive scientific use of ‘internal 
representation’ was from the outset meant to be thoroughly purged of that 
connotation. Barrett is right, however, to note that this means that the 
generative model is not representing the world to the agent. Rather, it functions within 
the agent to enable apt response to the world. But better yet, the prediction 
error signal here provides the perfect means of driving multi-level multi-scale 
processes of self-organization. For prediction error is a self-computable signal 
that enables both learning and ongoing online response. By stressing self-
organizing around prediction error, every hint of the controlling homunculus is 
purged from the PP paradigm. 
 
Rob Goldstone invites us to consider something that he calls the  ‘Reverse 
Parity Principle’ (RPP). RPP states that “ a brain component should be 
considered to be part of a distributed cognitive system if we would accept it as 
being part of a distributed system if it were non-biological.” This is consistent 
with the idea that sometimes, individual cognitive systems extend and is 
another manifestation (as Goldstone notes) of the idea that we can profit from 
thinking about complex functional organizations in ways that are not biased by 
metabolic boundaries. Applying this in the opposite direction to the extended 
mind corpus, RPP allows us to take intuitions developed by looking at 
distributed organizations and apply them to the organization of a single brain.  
 
This is a neat flip, and one that strikes me as both legitimate and illuminating. 
In particular, Goldstone stresses three features that have been explored in 
distributed settings and that might be re-applied to the organization of a single 
brain. The features are specialization, tool creation, and ‘indirect levers’. 
Specialization within distributed organizational forms is manifest in the division 
of labour between elements and groups. But within the brain, it speaks to the 
increase of internal structure over time, and the developmental emergence of 
functional specializations in some brain areas even for evolutionarily recent 
developments such as reading and exact mathematics. Tool creation means 
what it says, the creation of new tools for tasks, including tools for toolbuilding. 
But applied in the single brain setting, it suggests the creation of new mini-
systems that help us do specific kinds of things better. This potentially overlaps 
	   17	  
with ‘specialization’ but Goldstone especially stresses the role of ‘perception 
and action modules as tools shaped – by automatic unconscious processes - to 
our needs’. Finally, ‘indirect levers’ are ways of shaping our own responses that 
can work even though we are unable to reach directly into the brain to do so. 
Instead, we might ‘hack our own minds’ by means of novel targeted training 
methods, some impressive examples of which are given in the text.  
 
Goldstone’s larger vision here looks to be one in which the brain is seen as a 
bag of tricks, but a bag whose nature may be best understood by looking at 
some general principles and tactics whose operation is visible in many kinds of 
organization, both inner and outer/distributed. I am sympathetic to this broad 
vision, but suggest that another (not incompatible) key organizing principle 
involves the organismically self-computed ‘prediction error signal’. This 
quantity, as argued above, arguably plays a key role in both learning and 
ongoing response. Most importantly for present purposes, it enables self-
estimated uncertainty to orchestrate – without the need for an overseeing 
homunculus – the activation and use of the right inner resources at the right 
time. In so doing, it may also recruits motor routines that can fold in the use of 
gross bodily or bio-external resources as required, deferring to those external 
resources whenever that reflects best overall policy in problem-solving context. 
In this way, self-organization around prediction error may be the glue that 
binds inner and outer into coherent but transient ensembles.  
 
David Kirsh asks – very reasonably in my view – what is really at stake in the 
debate between those who embrace extended cognition and those who see the 
mind as ‘merely’ productively embedded in ways that make good use of the 
body and world? Kirsh anchors his discussion in (pretty robust) intuitions 
concerning the status of physical prostheses as candidate body-parts, and offers 
four criteria to distinguish the extended and the merely embedded. The first 
two are unproblematic. True extensions, Kirsh suggests, should be temporally 
tightly coupled to, and ‘in sync with’ with the rest of the system – just like a 
good prosthetic limb. And the coupling needs to be phenomenologically 
transparent at the time of use, so it serves our wider purposes rather than itself 
being an object of thought.  
 
A third requirement is that the bio-external stuff be orchestrated and controlled 
by the person’s own inner processes. Thus, I should control my prosthetic limb, 
rather than it act alone or so as to control me. Taken as a general rule this one 
strikes me as potentially more problematic, since it suggests the kind of 
asymmetry often used to motivate quite strongly internalist viewpoints. What 
seems right is the idea that whichever bit or bits of an extended bio-
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technological hybrid system happens to be currently ‘in control’, the overall 
phenomenology is one of fluid agentive doing. Just as in skilled driving an 
automatic braking system (ABS) can autonomously act so as to balance the 
braking action, so control might sometimes be located in the bio-external parts 
of an extended system. In a futuristic prosthetic limb, perhaps the fingers, or 
other brand-new effector forms, might make some local decisions in a similar 
kind of way to the ABS?  
 
Finally, Kirsh suggests that we should require ‘bidirectional coupling’, so that 
each element can materially affect the other. This helps avoid trivial-seeming 
extensions involving ‘just looking’ at a target say. I agree that these cases are 
not thereby rendered ones of cognitive extension. But I am not convinced of 
the requirement. A brain area that merely stores information that other areas 
can later access, without those acts of access altering the stored information, 
would surely have counted as part of the cognitive system. Even if no such 
areas exist, it seems wrong to rule them out merely on grounds of failing this 
form of bidirectionality. What really matters, I suggest, is just that the area or 
resource is one that is reliably invoked as part of a process which, were it all to 
occur inside the head, would uncritically be accepted as a cognitive process of 
that agent. There is no obvious way to then render ‘just-looking’ cases 
acceptable, since that would mean paradoxically nesting the actual environment 
(rather than some kind of trace or representation of it) inside the putative 
agent! 
 
Kirsh then looks back at the original Clark and Chalmers case studies, arguing 
that the Tetris case (which as based in part on work by Kirsh and Maglio 
(1994)) meets the revised, prosthetics-inspired set of requirements but that the 
infamous Otto case does not. This is because external rotation is tightly 
coupled in all the right ways, whereas consulting the notebook fails to offer the 
kind of tight, fluid, integration seen in Tetris or prosthetic limbs. The picture 
here is one in which consulting the notebook is a rather hit and miss process, 
temporally patchy, subject to multiple kinds of breakdown. The combined 
upshot is that it fails to become transparent equipment. In response, I’d note 
that Clark and Chalmers do insist that the notebook share key aspects of the 
functional poise of bio-memory – that it be fluidly and automatically deployed 
as and when required. So anything that gets fundamentally in the way of that 
simply violates the conditions of the original thought-experiment. The hit and 
miss scenarios are thus ruled out without needing to endorse any (to my mind 
somewhat problematic) further constraints on cognitive extensions as such.  
 
	   19	  
What about bio-external resources when they are not in use? The picture that 
Kirsh offers – one whose phenomenal requirements I fully endorse – applies 
only at the moment of tightly-coupled use (the moment of automatic systemic 
invocation). Concerning such resources at other times, Kirsh’ suggestion is that 
this becomes a matter for law and precedent rather than philosophy and 
science. In one way this seems right. But there may be fundamental principles 
we can appeal to as well. For example, I suspect that a lot will turn on the ease 
of replacement of the contested resource. If I can very easily get a new 
prosthetic that fits just as well, it may not count strongly as part of me when 
not in use. But in fact, prosthetic limbs take time to become well-fitted and it 
can be quite traumatic when new ones, even of the very same model, are 
required. It may be this personalized dovetailing (rather than ongoing spatial 
location or ongoing active coupling) that is the key feature. If so, then delicately 
dovetailed, hard-to-replace stuff that meets conditions for cognitive 
incorporation should count as part of ‘my cognitive apparatus’ even when not 
actively in use. After all, it may be that aspects of my internal cognitive system 
are sometimes not ‘in use’ (perhaps during deep sleep).  
 
Returning to that compelling prosthetic metaphor, the 10th century Persian 
philosopher-scientist Avicenna (Ibn Sina) observed6 of our own biological 
body-parts that: 
 
“These bodily members are, as it were, no more than garments; which, 
because they have been attached to us for a long time, we think are us, 
or parts of us [and] the cause of this is the long period of adherence: we 
are accustomed to remove clothes and to throw them down, which we 
are entirely unaccustomed to do with our bodily members”. 
 
I leave the reader to conduct the interesting exercise of repeating this line of 
reasoning for aspects of our own internal cognitive apparatus not actively ‘in 
use’. (Hint: let’s not risk shrinking the mind and self to the size of a boot 
program – a few lines of code that get the operating system up and running). 
 
Kim Sterelny sets out in lively pursuit of the extended mind ‘over deep time’. 
Sterelny’s main focus is on the emergence and explosion of material and 
cultural scaffoldings – what made that possible, and when that vastly 
empowering and transformative incremental snowball really got rolling. At the 
heart of his story lies a fascinating puzzle. There is a large temporal gap, it 
seems, separating the first appearance of ‘anatomically modern’ humans and 
the explosion of material culture. Sterelny, after discussing the possible role of 
demography and social organization, turns to a very interesting further 
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(consistent and complementary) possibility. This is the possibility (neatly 
defended by Heyes (2018)) that cultural evolution itself delivered innovations 
that streamlined and improved cultural learning, building mind-tools upon 
mind-tools (cognitive gadgets upon cognitive gadgets) so as to enable the 
explosion of material culture itself. According to Heyes, key capacities such as 
‘mind-reading’, language, and imitation learning may themselves be cultural 
products – software updates installed not by evolution but by general-purpose 
learning mechanisms. But once those updates are available, the snowballing 
process of incremental cultural learning and transmission really gets going. For 
some of the updates are updates that permit the sharing, improvement, and 
transmission of updates. If I read him right, Sterelyn thinks that further key 
aspects of this socio-cultural ‘ignition’ may be documented by Kelly (2015) in 
important work on formal performances, mnemonic devices, ritual, and oral 
traditions. Unfortunately, ‘soft’ technologies leave few traces so precise time-
lining remains, Sterelny argues, problematic.  
 
That said, the general picture is compelling. Our extended and (more generally) 
highly socio-culturally and materially scaffolded minds are not the direct 
products of key genetic variations in our species. This is quite unlike, say, the 
remarkable mole cricket, some species of which build and exploit physically 
perfect ‘Klipsch horns’ as a means of efficient sound production. The crickets 
– beautifully described in Turner (2000) - benefit from genetic programs that 
lead to feedback-tuned excavation and tunneling. With the ground itself then 
acting as a very large (near-infinite) baffle, and the boost of a (sometimes 
double) exponential horn, these crickets obtain an almost unimaginable 
increase in acoustic efficiency! The cricket thus benefits from bio-external 
scaffolding. But that scaffolding is just another expression of their bedrock 
genetic organization. Our human tools and scaffoldings, by contrast, seem 
open-ended and self-multiplying: in our worlds, even the strategies needed to build 
specific external structures (such as paper-mills, universities, and factories) can 
be preserved, improved, and transmitted by non-biological means. Minds like 
ours are thus open-endedly extensible, with extensions breeding new 
extensions, and no limit currently in sight. 
 
Section 3: Embodied, Extended, but Predictive Too? 
 
 
Mike Anderson and Tony Chemero speak up strongly for the role of 
ecological information (which I’ll expand upon shortly) in the construction of 
adaptive response. Getting straight about ecological information, they argue, 
shows how we can be truly in touch with the world, even if we are also (as work 
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on ‘predictive processing’ (PP) claims) in the business of predicting the shape 
and evolution of the impinging sensory flux. Doing so helps reconcile PP with 
the full gamut of insights from embodied cognition, as argued in Clark (2016a)). 
But it also forces us (Anderson and Chemero suggest) to adopt a more 
deflationary reading of key aspects of the PP apparatus itself – specifically, a 
deflationary reading of PP’s appeal to inner models, information, and 
representation.  
 
The paper start with a great example – the way we humans sway when standing. 
That swaying, they report, is not some kind of motor defect so much as a 
functional strategy that helps us harvest good information for the control of 
adaptive response. It turns out that the form and directionality of the swaying 
alters in task-sensitive ways, and is best understood as a means of generating 
‘optic flow’ that reveals task-relevant features of the world.  
 
The brain’s role in such a process is well captured by PP. I’d gloss that 
‘capturing’ by saying that PP co-constructs perception and action, and that 
those bodily movements (the functional, context-sensitive swayings) reflect 
neural best-guesses about where, when, and how task-relevant information is to 
be found. Anderson and Chemero construct the case in a subtly different way. 
They go on to suggest that the ecological perspective offers a direct route into 
‘semantics’ here. They say: 
 
“Ecological information—the information available to a moving animal 
in the environment—is inherently semantic because it specifies the 
affordances of that environment, what the animal can do in that 
environment, and generates and supports expectations for what that 
moving animal will experience as it moves. Ecological information 
reveals the world as significant for a given creature.” (Ms page 4, my 
emphasis) 
 
I quote the passage in full because I pondered it, in its full textual context, for a 
very long time. It seems to suggest (in context) that the question of how minds 
get to ‘make worlds available’ is resolved by noting that some systems get to 
pick up on the affordances that matter for the kind of being they are. A lot here 
depends on what it means to make a world available. A simple robot could do 
this kind of thing. It would properly be assigned an Umwelt. But the simple 
affordance-sensitive robot need not thereby experience any world at all.  
 
A few paragraphs later, Anderson and Chemero press their concerns further, 
suggesting that common constructions of PP make the mistake of down-
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playing the richness and potency of all that ecological information, yielding a 
spurious puzzle (how to deal with an impoverished signal) whose solution then 
appeals to inner models as a way of adding back the missing stuff.  
 
I think their idea is this. If you start (Shannon-style) from mere non-semantic 
‘information’ you will never bridge the gap between mere information and 
semantics. But if you start from the enriched land of ‘ecological information’, 
there is no gap to cross in the first place. That’s because ecological information 
directly structures apt action, and apt action is in some sense all there ever is to 
meaning. This secures a strong form of epistemic directness - we are in touch 
with a world as it matters for our needs and purposes. This has a superficially 
very different flavor to saying that our access goes via some inner predictive 
model of the world. Surely a view that depicts perception as a highly 
constructive, model-driven process threatens to cut us off from the world that 
ecological information makes so readily available? So we seem to face a stark 
choice: perception as ecological pick-up, putting us in touch with the world, 
versus perception as model-based ‘controlled hallucination’, keeping the world 
at arm’s (or maybe mind’s) length. The lurking threat is that PP, constructed in 
the latter way, delivers us straight back into the arms of Descartes – ethereal 
minds cut off 7  from the world, encountering only our own ‘controlled 
hallucinations’ or ‘virtual realities’. The appeal to ecological information, by 
contrast, works against the idea that the worldly information is impoverished 
and in need of sifting and enriching by inner models. 
 
But perhaps the debate should not be structured around these old constructs of 
directness and indirectness? An alternative view (and the one I tried to suggest 
in Clark (2016a) and elsewhere) is that PP provides promising apparatus for 
dissolving the tension, by allowing a system to rely to a greater or lesser extent 
on ecological information according to changing contexts and task-demands. 
Prediction error here appears as the prime principle of self-organization. If 
task-salient prediction error is easily resolved at lower levels (as with simple 
reflexes and over-learnt behaviors), a system will look to simply be tuned to its 
environment, in ways that seem essentially model-free. But if prediction error is 
pushed further and further through the system, recruiting complex world-
knowledge and requiring effortful processing, it will look to be functioning 
within a richly model-based economy. The truth of the matter, though, may be 
that the core goal of maintaining behavioral success is always and everywhere 
achieved in the same general fashion, by using estimated precision to recruit 
and emphasize just those aspects of the available information, and to recruit 
and temporarily privilege just those inner and outer resources, that working 
together offer the most frugal solution to the creature’s ongoing needs and 
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long-term goals. Huge swathes of work in contemporary PP are devoted to 
showing, in quite fine detail, just how these checks and balances may operate, 
allowing creatures to balance exploration against exploitation, epistemic 
foraging against pragmatic action, and short-term interests against long-term 
plans. 
 
Does that picture leave us cut off from the world? I don’t think so. The PP 
strategy of using self-estimated uncertainty to repeatedly reconfigure complex 
organizations so as to reduce task-salient prediction error allows these systems 
to make maximal use of ecological (often self-generated) information, within a 
cognitive regime that can sometimes look to be operating almost model-free, at 
other times model-rich, and (crucially) all points in between. There is a sense in 
which perception, especially when it involves complex predictions from the 
higher levels, could indeed be thought of as ‘controlled hallucination’. But PP 
also shows just how perception strips away unhelpful noise to reveal the core 
shape of the task-salient signal – a signal frequently apt to guide behavior in just 
the way the ecological frameworks suggest. 
 
Anderson and Chemero close with the pregnant suggestion that standard 
philosophical conceptions of belief, knowledge, and justification 
maytransformed beyond recognition once we take a thoroughly ‘affordance and 
action-oriented’ picture on board. They are right. Re-modeling the old 
epistemology in ways that respect the fundamentally action-centric picture 
emerging from contemporary cognitive science is, I think, one of the most 
pressing tasks for 21st century Philosophy of Mind. But my guess is that such 
re-modeling will reveal these questions of ‘inferential seclusion’ versus ‘open 
access to the world’ as pseudo-questions that depend for their very intelligibility 
on mistaken pictures of what it means to perceive and to know a world. 
 
Karl Friston – whose patience with a non-mathematically-sophisticated 
philosopher never ceases to delight and amaze me - urges me to ‘take the high 
road’. As the son of a Scotsman, the ‘low road’ to me usually means death 
(considered, in the famous refrain8, to provide the fastest way back to Scotland) 
while the high road consists in the normal terrestrial route! But Karl’s high road 
is something rather more exalted – the derivation of PP itself from first 
principles involving existence, persistence, ergodicity and Markov blankets.  
 
In brief, the high road starts by noting that creature’s that exist do so by 
preferentially inhabiting the states (inner and outer) that are necessary for them 
to do so. This attracting set of states makes them mathematically  ‘ergodic’, 
visiting and re-visiting the very states that define them as the creature they 
	   24	  
happen to be. This, in turn, makes sense only if there is a demarcation of some 
kind between the creature (or system of interest) and the rest of the universe. 
Such demarcation is captured by the technical notion of a Markov blanket, here, 
the set of states forming the boundary at issue. Now we have a blanketed 
system that seems (from a certain perspective) temporarily to resist entropy, 
using up energy to stay within the very states that define it. Any such system, 
Friston observes, is a model of its world in – but perhaps only in -  the sense 
that it will seem, in its behavior, to be in the business of locating the good 
(viability- maintaining) states/places and avoiding the others. This, Friston 
notes, is as true for for a bacterium as for a bishop. Indeed, we might even see 
the humble oil-drop (op cit p.4) in the same broad way. All these systems 
persist because (tautologically) they act and react in ways that preferentially 
harvest the kinds of state that define them, thus maximizing their own ‘self-
evidence’. In this way “the very fact you exist means that you will behave like 
you have a model of your world that predicts sensory samples with a high 
accuracy and minimal complexity” (Friston, this volume, ms page 5). The free 
energy principle itself, Friston then notes, amounts to a re-statement of these 
tautologies and implicatures. For it is  is “just a way of defining systems 
(Markov blankets) that exist (are ergodic).”. This is what Friston aptly describes 
as “the tautological denouement of the high road.” 
 
I draw the reader’s attention to the use of language hereabouts. Friston says 
that such systems will behave ‘like’ they have a model of the world. Elsewhere 
in the same text, there is talk of them as behaving ‘’ they have beliefs about the 
world. We also read that a model, in this usage, is “just an ergodic system or 
phenotype”, reminding me of his response to my (2013) BBS paper, in which 
he argues that agents don’t have predictive world-models, but simply are such 
models This is all quite revealing. Talk of models, in this sense, looks to be 
computationally and ontologically undemanding (just as Anderson and 
Chemero argued). It is perhaps best understood9 simply as a handy use of 
language by the scientist (the modeler) rather than a substantial claim about the 
cognitive organization of the modeled system. I’ll return to such matters shortly. 
 
The low road, meanwhile, is not – I’m glad to report - death but the ‘effective 
information processing’ route to PP. That route is pursued at length in Clark 
(2013) (2016a) and elsewhere, and invokes primarily consideration of 
bandwidth, speed, and flexibility. By using cascades of top-down generative-
model based prediction, and feeding only residual errors forward level by level, 
creatures like us are able to devote expensive processing resources only to what 
is newsworthy in the sensory stream. And by repeatedly reconfiguring our own 
processing in ways guided by self-estimated uncertainty (‘precision’), we are 
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able to respond flexibly to changing tasks and needs, sorting signal from noise 
in ways that are deeply (inner and outer) context-respecting. This is meant as a 
substantial and falsifiable claim about the cognitive organization of the target 
system. 
 
Friston argues that this low-road landscape can, and should, be derived using 
only the high road (sparse, tautological) ingredients. I’m not really sure about 
that, one way or the other. But even supposing that it is true, it does not follow 
that all the low road talk of PP systems as having or deploying (and not simply 
being) multi-level probabilistic models of their worlds, or as representing those 
worlds in appropriately action-oriented ways, or as approximating Bayesian 
inference, is thereby revealed as demanding no more than the same talk does 
when applied – via the high road - to the bacterium or the oil drop. The high 
road delivers notions of prediction, model, and Bayesian inference only in 
highly attenuated (‘as if’) form, whereas the low road – or so I claim - amounts 
to a very substantial empirical bet concerning the organization of information 
flow in the brain/CNS, and the way that flow contributes to embodied agency.  
So much as I admire the inviolable beauty of high road, I prefer to keep it at a 
safe distance. It may well offer a set of fundamentally tautologous principles 
that frame the entirety of life and mind (even if the oil drop remains something 
of a puzzle). But that strength is also a kind of liability, for it means that 
evidence that every actively self-maintaining system conforms to the free 
energy principle and displays the high road profile is hardly news. They have to, 
on pain of failing to persist as objects of study at all. What is left wide open is 
the question of how different systems do so, which is the home of various 
possible process stories of which PP is just one among many.  
 
Finally, I note with interest that the Epilogue to Friston’s piece iterates the high 
road considerations, turning them back on themselves so that some creatures 
will look as if they have beliefs about their own generative models, in ways that 
might lead them to display behaviors such as novelty-seeking and the pursuit of 
science and philosophy. Karl then asks me if I believe – given such tempting 
high road meta-constructions – that there are any ‘imperatives that live beyond 
the free energy principle’. I’m not sure, perhaps because I’m not sure what it 
takes to be an imperative in this sense. But I do think that we need to give 
processes of incremental cultural change some real credit hereabouts. A leading 
lesson of the work on embodied and EEE cognition is that we repeatedly build 
new social and material worlds around ourselves, including new worlds to train 
ourselves to think about our worlds. It may be only courtesy of these slowly 
culturally-installed lenses that there ever emerge complex systems that not only 
predict worlds, each other, and sensory outcomes but that also model 
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themselves as model-using systems that predict worlds, each other, and sensory 
outcomes.  
 
Next up, Jakob Hohwy10  continues his engaging, friendly, yet philosophically 
incisive campaign to push me out of my comfort zone, using PP to argue for a 
picture that involves “rich and reconstructive, detached, truth-seeking inner 
representations, characterized by fragile inferential processes, and harboured 
within the nervous system’s unitary, fixed, non-extended Markov blanket” (ms 
p. 1). This – as should be clear from the previous responses - is not the mind-
world relation that I think PP delivers.  
 
One key place where we part company, it now seems, is in our conception of 
the role and functioning of the core ‘precision-weighting’ tool itself. Precision-
weighting, recall, reflects self-estimated uncertainty and alters the influence of 
specific predictions or prediction errors on ongoing processing. High-weighted 
prediction errors, to take the basic case, enjoy greater post-synaptic gain, and so 
have greater influence over the unfolding regime. High-weighted predictions, 
meanwhile, are less open to revision by sensory information, which would 
arrive (in the usual PP fashion) as prediction errors11. In my own treatments, 
precision-weighting is the secret of the putatively happy union between PP and 
work in EEE  (embodied, extended, enactive) cognition. This is because 
varying precision estimations vary the balance of power between incoming 
signals and top-down predictions, and also create transient webs of effective 
connectivity. They thus deliver what is in effect a succession of special-purpose 
wiring diagrams for the brain, with radically different diagrams reflecting 
different tasks and different (bodily and environmental) contexts. Moreover, 
those special-purpose wiring diagrams are responsible for generating actions 
that (in context) exploit environmental opportunities and harvest new sensory 
information- a process that results in new swathes of predictions and precision-
estimations. Brains like that are best seen as potent nodes in a rolling process of 
self- reconfiguration: one that weaves brain, body, and worldly opportunities 
into a succession of transient but highly efficient problem-solving wholes.  
 
It is variable precision-weighting that thus allows us (Clark (2016a) (2017)) 
sometimes to look very much like well-tuned ecological pick-up devices, that 
simply latch onto whatever simple environmental cues will best guide ongoing 
action in the world, and at other times more like reflective engines, pondering 
our next move from the deepest reaches of our generative world-model. In the 
former case, a transient web of precision estimations ensures that task-relevant 
prediction error is rapidly and efficiently dealt with using sparse resources. In 
the latter case, prediction error penetrates deeper and deeper, requiring more 
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and more neural (and perhaps extra-neural) resources to damp it down to the 
tolerances of anticipated noise. I have described (Clark (2016a)) poster-child 
cases such as running to catch a fly ball in baseball in essentially the former 
terms, but any skilled thinker or performer is adept at spinning transient webs 
of connectivity that enable her to solve complex puzzles using minimal 
resources. As I often remark, the most under-appreciated role of a rich world-
model is identifying situations in which a slimmer fragment is all that is needed 
to do the job. 
 
Hohwy then raises an important  puzzle. On the one hand, I’m committed to 
depicting much of human (and non-human) performance as rooted in these 
fast, efficient, strategies. This is one reason why I don’t see PP as an insulating, 
intellectualist, internally-reconstructive approach. On the other hand, there is 
no doubt that the careful spinning of these webs of delicate transient, world-
engaging connectivity is itself a fairly high-grade achievement. There is, as he 
puts it (this volume, ms p.4)  “a potential tension here between both allowing 
and withholding a role for rich models”.  
 
The tension is especially marked for Hohwy, since he argues that we must 
repeatedly infer when we are in situations where low-cost solutions are viable, 
and that that requires (op cit p.5)  “continuous modelling and tracking of all the 
relevant potential causal interactions across all contexts”. Indeed, Hohwy goes 
further still adding that “predicting that there will not be any volatility-inducing 
causal interaction in a given context requires just as much rich modeling as 
predicting that there will be interactions” and that “without the rich model 
actually and continuously exerting its influence even in the conditions suitable 
for quick and dirty processing, there is no principled…setting of the gain on 
the prediction error”. 
 
But I wonder if this isn’t a subtly mistaken picture of the development and 
application of expertise? It seems entirely possible that what training and 
immersion eventually deliver is the capacity to use simple environmental cues 
to activate (in the absence of any higher-level defeaters) a web of default 
precision assignments that install the transient organizational structure that best 
confronts that kind of puzzle in that kind of context. The concert pianist, sat at 
the piano, in the familiar concert hall, would thus fairly automatically recruit a 
web of precision estimations apt for the task. Were some novel circumstance or 
new instruction to intrude,that would generate prediction errors whose 
resolution recruit additional resources. But in the ordinary unfolding, I see no 
reason to think that the richness of the full world-model need actively be in 
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play. So I am unpersuaded that my appeals to variable precision-weighting 
merely re-invoke the full rich world-model ‘one level up’ as it were.  
 
This is not to deny that there really is, in advanced minds, what Hohwy 
describes as “immense storage of causal knowledge”. There surely is. But 
moment-by-moment, self-organizing around the computable quantity of 
prediction error, we manifest as a succession of relatively special-purpose brain-
body-world devices, strung together by those shifting but self-organizing web 
of precision-weighting. In Humean spirit, no ponderous, all-knowing 
homunculus sits atop this web, carefully deciding moment-by-moment just 
what to do, and how to assign precision. Self-organizing around prediction 
error delivers precision variations, hence new effective connectivity patterns. 
These drive actions that weave the multi-level prediction machinery deeply  
into our worlds. We are perhaps misled because in the human case there 
sometimes emerge transient special-purpose devices for reflecting on our own 
nature, and on what kinds of future devices we wish to usher into being. One 
day, perhaps, we will see this as just ‘more of the same’, finally exorcizing the 
Cartesian demon from the tapestry of mind. 
 
Orlandi and Lee set out to resist a certain gloss on PP. The gloss, in their 
words, depicts PP as “essentially a top-down, expectation-driven process, on 
which perception is aptly thought of as “controlled hallucination”” Orlandi and 
Lee (this volume) ms p.1. Pushing back against this kind of gloss, Orlandi and 
Lee write that: 
 
“in a novel environment, at least initially, the visual system’s priors will 
be neutral between many possibilities, and the bottom-up signal will do 
most of the work. [So] there’s nothing in the model ruling out current 
evidence often being much more informative than past evidence 
(….contrary to Clark’s emphasis).” Orlandi and Lee ms p.4 
 
There are at least two issues being raised here. One concerns the mechanics of 
dealing with novel environments. The other, more subtle but I think ultimately 
more interesting and important, is their subsequent claim that sometimes, even 
assuming the PP story, the bottom-up signal thus does ‘most of the work’. This 
is true in one way but false in another, as we’ll shortly see. 
 
Let’s start, though, by looking at the mechanics of perception in a novel 
environment. Imagine that I am taken from my bed one night, sedated, and 
then awake in a brand new, wholly unexpected, place. How do I recognize what 
kind of place I am in? Here is the PP story as told by Barrett and Bar (2009), 
	   29	  
and rehearsed in Clark (2016a) p.42). First, very general, extremely rapidly 
processed (low spatial frequency) features of the sensory input enable an initial 
guess at the rough gist of the scene - is it a natural scene, a face, animals, an 
industrial landscape…? With apt gist-level prediction active, the full apparatus 
of top-down prediction gets a grip, as flurries of finer and finer-grained 
predictions concerning the details of the scene are generated and tested against 
the sensory evidence. The emergence of a rich and stable percept thus depends 
heavily, even in this unusually extreme case, upon the apt flow of top-down 
prediction, even though it is instigated using early rapid processing of low-level 
sensory cues. 
 
But we should also ask how often we find ourselves in such truly unexpected 
environments anyway? In the ecologically normal run of things, I am not often 
kidnapped, nor is my brain suddenly ‘turned on’ in some fundamentally 
unpredicted situation. Instead, my life mostly consists in moving through a 
succession of quite substantially predictable environments, many of which I 
actively bring forth.  For example, I find myself in the shopping mall because I 
set out to acquire a new set of headphones. As I move through this actively 
self-solicited space, multiple apt predictions are at all times in play, some of 
which meet resistance from the world, generating prediction errors that select, 
tune and nuance the flow of prediction12.  
 
But all this is really just a skirmish around the edges of a much deeper question, 
that concerns what it means to say that sometimes the bottom-up signal still 
‘does most of the work’. Heard one way, this is clearly and importantly true. 
Much of the power of the PP schema lies, as we have repeatedly seen, in the 
use of variable precision-weighting to modify the relative impacts of 
predictions and prediction errors according to self-estimated uncertainty. That 
immediately implies that under some circumstances perception can be very 
powerfully driven by the incoming sensory signal, while under others (such as 
viewing the hollow mask illusion) our predictions trump many aspects of the 
incoming signal.  But there remains a sense in which, from a PP perspective13, 
giving high-weighting to the sensory evidence is not quite the same as having 
the bottom-up flow do ‘most of the work’. This is because, contrary to Orlandi 
and Lee, the top-down and bottom-up flows are not symmetric. Top-down 
predictions interact with each other in highly complex (non-linear) ways, while 
bottom-up prediction errors (PP suggests) do not.  
 
To take a simple example (from Adams et al (2013) p.613) my predictions of 
the local sensory flux turn upon knowledge about objects, but any given object 
may be partially occluded by other objects in the scene. Predictions thus weave 
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together, reflecting all that we know about causes and complex inter-
dependencies in the world. Prediction errors, meanwhile, are free to behave in 
much simpler ways, carrying their bespoke residual information until some 
complex weave of prediction quashes it – or occasionally surviving to drive 
plasticity and contribute to long-term learning.  In this way descending 
predictions respect complex non-linearities within the generative model, while 
ascending errors do not.  
 
Orlandi and Lee are thus wrong to conclude (ms page 7) that “we are… just 
combining two separate estimates of the stimulus [one top-down and one 
bottom-up] in a way that is essentially symmetrical between processing 
directions”. For all the heavy (non-linear) lifting, PP asserts, is done by the 
predictions. This crucial functional asymmetry provides the deep reason why 
the PP framework, despite allowing for highly variable balances of power 
between sensory evidence and top-down prediction, is nonetheless properly 
described as one in which the top-down flow does special (and especially 
powerful) work. This also bears on their observation that “the right 
interpretation of the predictive coding model is that it does involve information 
about stimulus features being fed forward”. In one sense this is uncontentious. 
Prediction errors are information (mathematically, they are the original 
information minus the prediction). So information about stimulus features are 
indeed being fed forward (though it is information relative to a prediction). But 
this, for the reasons just scouted, does not render the top-down and bottom-up 
flows symmetric.  
 
Orlandi and Lee end by raising important questions concerning the relative 
merits and demerits of optimal feedback control (OFC) and active inference. 
Some of these turn on quite technical issues that are beyond the scope of this 
reply. But I would want to resist their suggestion that OFC is somehow more 
explanatory just because active inference replaces cost functions with predictions. 
The choice of cost functions (e.g. for a mobile robot) is itself an infamously 
black art. At worst, active inference replaces that black art with another – the 
installation of the priors that enable apt prediction. But in fact this reallocation 
(in which cost functions are treated as priors) has many useful consequences 
(rehearsed in Clark (2016a) chapter 4). For example, it is known that everything 
that can be specified by a cost function can be specified by some prior over 
trajectories, but not vice versa (see Friston (2011). Related concerns have led 
both dynamicists and roboticists to argue that explicit cost-function based 
solutions are inflexible, make unrealistic demands on online processing, and 
lack biologically plausible means of implementation (Thelen and Smith (1994), 
Feldman (2009), Mohan and Morasso (2011)). 
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Which brings me to remarkable and illuminating contribution by Jesse Prinz. 
Prinz asked, in effect, what (if anything) held my various views together? What 
agenda, proclivity, or persisting take on the mind provides the common ground 
between my work on connectionism, robotics, embodied and extended 
cognition, and predictive processing (PP)? My self-narrative, Prinz notes, has it 
that PP at last provides the single, overarching umbrella that neatly 
encompasses the best insights from them all. I do believe that to be true. But 
the question Prinz poses runs deeper. It runs deeper in roughly the way that 
insights delivered by various forms of psychoanalysis run deeper than the 
behavior patterns themselves, even if they fit together neatly enough. Indeed, 
by the end of Prinz’ generous yet probative treatment, I felt very much as if I 
had been through a deep and highly personal process, fallen predictably in love 
with my analyst, and learnt something new and useful about my own goals and 
motivations. By way of reply, I’ll simply re-trace his route, offering my own 
reactions (from the couch, as it were) along the way. 
 
Prinz starts by noting some themes from the early work. Microcognition (back in 
1989) was aiming to preserve many insights (especially those concerning 
structured information processing) from classical AI while at the same time 
defending a deeply connectionist picture of core biological processing. By 1997, 
with Being There and work on the extended mind, I was looking hard at how 
richly structured and (especially) richly self-structured environments enable us 
to press ever grander results from that associative, pattern-obsessed core. In 
the noughties, Natural-Born Cyborgs and Supersizing the Mind offered a whoselsale 
picture of human nature as one whose USP is the blurring of boundaries 
between mind, body, and world. All that was followed by Surfing Uncertainty 
with its picture of our biological brains as (embodied, situated) multi-level 
prediction engines. How do these pictures inter-relate? 
 
One tempting option, Prinz suggests, is ‘evolution’. Perhaps each picture slowly 
adds to and refines the one before it, while themes of dynamic, de-centralized, 
scaffolded adaptive response recur throughout. But there are apparent 
disconnects too. Am I meaning to stress external scaffolding structures or 
internal predictions? Is cognition a bag of tricks or a single unified process? 
Can predictive minds really extend? Many of the other pieces in this volume 
pick up on this kind of question, asking - for example - if I mean to depict us as 
rich modelers or fluent ecological couplers (both, of course!).  
 
Prinz suggests a potential gulf between connectionism and the picture of the 
predictive brain. I’m not convinced by this.  Historically, core aspects of PP 
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emerged straight from a connectionist lineage via the work of Geoffrey Hinton 
and others – see e.g. Hinton (1990) (2007). But more importantly, I don’t think 
that PP involves a departure from a de-centralized dynamic vision, as Prinz 
seems to fear. On the contrary, PP strikes me as the best version yet of just 
such a vision. Prinz is concerned that PP may invoke ‘over-arching monitors 
that set values for precision’ (Section 3). That idea re-appears a bit later, when 
he wonders how the decision between rich model-based response and shallow 
more ‘model-free’ strategies is itself made, suggesting that “it is not clear how 
we make decisions about which strategy to deploy “ then asking “Who is the 
“we” here?  How do we manage the computational cost of such meta-cognitive 
oversight?”. Just as Prinz notes, I am optimistic here. This is because precision 
estimations are both learnt and later recruited in exactly the same way as 
predictions, by self-organizing around prediction error signals. As a result, PP is 
highly compatible with the de-centralized dynamic vision from the early work.  
 
Prinz is also doubtful that PP plays well with extended cognition, suggesting 
that if prediction is the mark of the mental, notebooks and their ilk look 
doomed to remain outside the cognitive apparatus. Here though, we need only 
note that those waves of precision-weighting weave inner predictions and 
world recruiting actions into a single problem-solving web, while also providing 
what was long missing – a principled account of how the inner and outer 
resources get together in just the right ways at just the right times. Perhaps 
prediction is indeed the mark of the terrestrial bio-mental – but nothing in the 
arguments for the extended mind required that there be no common core to 
the bio-mental contributions.  
 
Still, Prinz is right: none of these frameworks are quite the same and PP 
delivers, as he so delicately puts it, some quite serious ‘perturbations’. Unlike 
connectionism, PP systems depict a deep functional asymmetry between 
downward-flowing predictions and upward-flowing errors. And unlike some 
work on embodied cognition, PP relies heavily on structured inner knowledge. 
Differences could be multiplied.  
 
It is at about this point that Prinz dons a more ‘philosophy of science’ hat, 
suggesting that although my later positions cover many of the same cases, and 
may even use many of the same terms as before, the meanings of key terms may 
now shift and alter, in ways that subtly transform their empirical content and 
may even impact their metaphysical implications. Representations, for example, 
may be vectors, attractors, filters, or forward models. So even what looks like a 
seamless merging of older and newer ideas and perspectives may well involve 
revisions that strike deep into the heart of the earlier pictures.  
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What came next was, for me, a striking (almost psycho-analytic) moment of 
intellectual self-discovery. For each new framework, Prinz then argued, is really 
offering a new way of seeing ourselves, making everything spin, morph, and alter, 
around some new central construct, be it distributed representation, coupling, 
de-centralized control, offloading, or predictions. What I am selling, then, is 
really a succession of ways of understanding the mind – distinct perspectives 
each of which puts something new and potentially transformative at the center 
of the cognitive universe.  
 
That could be worrying. How could it be good to be so fickle? It is then that 
Prinz serves up a lovely and comforting thought. Could it be that each 
perspective is simply a kind of invitation to try out a new way of seeing 
ourselves, and the place of mind in the universe? Perhaps no one such picture 
can really hope to deliver the whole truth. But by fully inhabiting each picture, 
we learn something about who and what we are, and what we can hope to be. 
The exercise, Prinz suggests, is as much one of art as science. It is about 
bringing some stuff to the fore, and asking the reader to look at the world 
(even if only temporarily) through that lens.  
 
That rang true. It gave me a new way to look at my own work: a new way to 
think about both the changing landscape and my abiding sense of a continuous, 
progressive story. Prinz’s contribution thus performs exactly the function he so 
generously offers for mine  – it changed my manifest reality, giving me new 
ways to see and inhabit my world14. 
 
Anil Seth’s compelling contribution directly confronts core aspects of manifest 
human reality, using the rich resources of interoceptively inflected PP. 
Interoceptively inflected PP, Seth argues, moves us away from the picture of 
minds as mirrors (faithful, accurate inner models) of nature. Instead, we are 
invited to embrace our nature as ‘beast machines’ dedicated most 
fundamentally not to mirroring but to control – both the control of action and 
of our own inner states, so as to keep our systemic organizations within viable 
bounds. And therein, Seth argues, may lie the origins of feelings of 
embodiment, selfhood and subjectivity, and the key to understanding the 
emergence of consciousness in the material realm. 
 
The link between control and prediction is pretty direct, since to keep complex 
systems within bounds often requires anticipating breaching those bounds and  
taking pre-emptive steps to remedy the slide before it becomes too late. Indeed, 
Clark and Grush (1999) argued, pre-PP, that this kind of pre-emptive predictive 
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control marks the very spot at which genuine representing first appears in the 
natural order, as systems develop forward models able to support fluent action 
despite substantial delays in corrective feedback from the peripheral motor 
plant. What thus holds true for gross motor action is doubly true, as Seth 
powerfully notes, for internal ‘actions’ that support homeostatic regulation. 
Creatures must pre-emptively correct before blood sugar levels become too low, 
or before body temperatures reach below or above certain bounds – a process 
known as allostasis rather than simple homeostasis. Seth (and see also Friston 
(this volume) suggests that our neurobiological nature as prediction machines is 
rooted in this need for allostasis. 
 
Interoceptive predictions, Seth and others have argued 15 , help construct 
feelings and emotions by entering into Bayesian inferences that integrate 
information about context, action, and our own bodily state. These inferences 
combine exteroceptive, proprioceptive, and interoceptive information, issuing 
in predictions that engage the world and entrain the body. But this leaves a 
puzzle: How, Seth asks “can PP account for the qualitative differences between 
perceptual experiences of the external world, and self-related experiences such 
as emotion and experiences of having, and being, a body?”. These different 
experiences will each involve bringing together a host of information sources 
combined within a predictive matrix that self-organizes around prediction error. 
But they appear very different when viewed ‘from within’. Emotions, unlike 
tomatoes, do not appear to be located in space, and feelings of body-ownership 
seem even less ‘object-like’ than those of emotion, going way beyond just 
knowing how and where conjoined body-parts body are located in space. Seth 
argues that that interoceptive signals play an especially large role such cases, 
and that  “non-object-like phenomenology is linked to the control-oriented 
nature of interoceptive predictions.” 
 
 
In line with ‘sensorimotor contingency theory’ (O’Regan and Noë (2001)), Seth 
(2014)) suggests that our sense that the tomato is a solid object located in space 
may be linked to webs of sensorimotor know-how that involve predictions of 
how it would look and behave were we to act upon it in various ways, or to 
move around it. It is these predictions that constitute the experienced content 
of the tomato (unlike the emotion, say) being a solid 3D object in the world. 
The content of the percept is thus strongly influenced by the web of 
exteroceptive and proprioceptive (action-guiding) predictions. This, in turn, 
leads Seth to argue that these perceptual contents depend more on predictions 
than prediction errors since these key counterfactual predictions cannot (while 
remaining counterfactual) generate any prediction errors at all. But 
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interoceptive predictions behave differently, or so Seth argues. Actions rooted 
in our command of sensorimotor contingencies reveal counterfactually 
predicted facets of the external world. But inner allostatic actions change the 
inner world to fit predictions about its proper shape and bounds. They are 
control-oriented rather than discovery-oriented. Perhaps this difference 
explains the non-object-like phenomenologies of mood, emotion, and the 
physical embodiment? 
 
This is a neat idea, and one that I think has much to recommend it. It seems 
unlikely, though, that we here confront a very firm divide so much as a graded 
and changeable balance, in which nearly every conscious experience is 
interoceptively, exteroceptively, and proprioceptively informed in ways that 
vary with task and with inner and outer context. There may be puzzle cases too, 
such as the experience of pain. Seth (2013) mentions pain, but it’s not clear to 
me how well it fits the model proposed. Some pains (sports injuries especially)  
respond quite well to self-directed actions, such as rubbing or ice-ing, while 
others, such as organ pain,  seem locked into place in ways that no self-directed 
action systematically impacts.  In the former case (only) we soon learn a swathe 
of pain-related sensorimotor contingencies. But it is not clear which of these 
scenarios (if either) corresponds to experiencing the pain as more or less 
object-like. My own intuition is that it is the pain that is not subject to 
counterfactual motor-based manipulations that seems most object-like, 
potentially providing at least one case where the phenomenology does not 
follow the pattern Seth suggests.  
 
Seth ends with an eloquent description of how our nature as organic, self-
preserving ‘beast machines’ underpins our sense of embodied being in the 
world by placing interoceptively-informed predictive control at the core. Does 
this kind of picture makes real progress with the mystery of consciousness 
itself? I think it does. One thought emerging from our current  ERC-supported 
project (‘Expecting Ourselves’16) is that PP invites us to theorize conscious 
experience within a kind of 3-space whose axes are (i) the depth of the 
generative model (ii) the context-varying inflection of that model by 
interoceptive information, and (iii) the degree of self-modeling present (where 
that speaks to the sense of future-oriented unfolding and personal narrative 
that emerges when creatures that already score on the other two axes add 
themselves as new nodes or latent variables within their own generative model). 
It is that last dimension that allows some (but only some) sentient creatures to 
explore increasingly complex counterfactual scenarios contingent upon their 
own actions and choices. We suspect that it is also that last dimension that 
leads such creatures to find qualia and conscious experience especially puzzling. 
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For they model not just the external world, but themselves. Such beings belong to 
an intriguing group of systems that ‘expect themselves’, inferring that they are 
persisting agents that experience pains, see red, react to dangers, and encounter 
tempting tasty treats when opening fridge doors.   
 
Much of our scientific and philosophical puzzlement about ‘qualia’ may thus 
turn out to be misplaced, reflecting not some strange ontological status for 
qualia but our failure to appreciate that we model ourselves and our own 
reactive dispositions in much the same (simplified, compressed, pragmatic) way 
as we model the external world. We are beings that model ourselves as having 
qualitative experiences. Understanding the self-modeling origins of our own 
puzzlement concerning subjectivity and experience, while recognizing the many 
ways interoceptive and exteroceptive information combine in the service of 
adaptive success, may be the best recipe for solving the so-called ‘hard problem’ 
of consciousness itself  (for forays into this territory, see Dennett (2013) (2015), 
Clark (2016b)).  
 
We humans score highly on all three dimensions of this ‘consciousness matrix’. 
But it is easy to imagine other creatures and systems that score low on all three, 
or that score highly but only on one or two of them. A game-playing agent of 
the kind described by Mnih et al (2015) may have a deep (though very special-
purpose) generative model, but one that is not inflected by interoceptive 
information, and one that moreover operates without need for rich self-
modeling. Some animals, by contrast, may have deep and multi-purpose 
generative models, richly inflected by interoceptive information, but without 
needing rich models of themselves as individuals with distinct purposes and goals. 
And a simple robotic agent might already manage a low score on all three axes. 
In all these cases, rather than ask ‘so is that a conscious being or not’ perhaps 
we ought (as suggested by Sloman (2010)) merely to note the pattern of 
similarities and differences from our own case? 
 
Looking hard at living organizations quite different from our own is a powerful 
strategy, masterfully deployed by Barabara Webb in the closing essay. Webb 
specializes in understanding and modeling (often using robotic platforms) the 
adaptive strategies of insects - life-forms far removed from philosophy’s 
mammalian stomping grounds. Such life-forms, Webb rightly suggests, provide 
powerful test-cases for theories such as PP, insofar as they may aim at truly 
unifying pictures of perception, cognition, and action.  
 
Webb’s earlier work figured prominently in the push towards treating mind as a 
richly embodied phenomenon, revealing (for example) the many ways in which 
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insect performance emerged from delicate and often unexpected combinations 
of gross morphology, action, and neural circuitry. That work, as she notes, put 
some pressure on unreflective appeals to rich inner models and encodings, 
since insect success was often rooted in specialized, embodied strategies that 
sidestepped the need for accurate general-purpose ‘reconstructive’ 
representations of distal causes. My hope, as Webb notes, is that PP now 
provides a framework deeply amenable to that same push, since it treats 
perception, cognition, and action as locked in a circular dance,  self-organized 
around predictions, precisions (reflecting self-estimated sensory uncertainty), 
and prediction errors. 
 
But does PP actually get a useful grip on the insect case? The evidence is 
interestingly mixed. On the plus side, Webb points to exciting recent work that 
suggests that crickets, fruitflies, and dragonflies all use forward models to issue 
delicate and accurate predictions of their own upcoming behaviors, enabling 
them to factor out changes caused by their own actions from other sources of 
sensory perturbation (Webb (2004), Kim et al (2015), Mischiati et al (2014)). 
There is also evidence of prediction-error driven learning, and a plausible 
implementation story for insect forward models using the mushroom body 
neuropil, which boasts a layered, orderly, feedback rich architecture. Webb also 
notes that cockroaches, crickets, and fruitflies also seem to navigate using ‘place 
memory’ encodings akin to those supported by the hippocampus in rats and 
humans. In the light of this, it is interesting to add that recent work suggests 
that hippocampal place cells  “do not encode place per se but rather a 
predictive representation of future states given the current state.” (Stachenfeld 
et al (2017)).  
 
 
Forward models and prediction-error driven learning are thus plausibly in play, 
and active in multiple living organizations, including the insects. When it comes 
to the use of probabilistic generative models that deliver predictions in ways 
nuanced by self-estimated sensory uncertainty, however, things look more 
complicated. Webb’s group showed (Wystrach et al. (2015)) that certain ants 
seemed to perform optimal cue integration, combining information in ways 
that reflect ideal Bayesian estimations of how to weight different cues at 
different times. Are the ants full, if tiny, PP agents, actively estimating their 
own context-varying uncertainty, and using that estimate optimally to 
orchestrate the combination of different sources of information? Perhaps. But 
another possibility, suggested by further experimental manipulations, is that the 
ants moving away from the nest use a simple proxy (home vector length) that 
stands in for self-estimated sensory uncertainty. This easy-to-compute quantity 
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acts as a special-purpose trick that mimics – for the kind of cue integration the 
ants actually need – the calculation of their own path-integration uncertainty.  
 
This leads Webb to raise an important question: “If the ant’s ability to do 
optimal cue integration has been hard coded by evolution, does it still count as 
evidence for the PP view?” Staunch proponents of the full ‘free energy 
minimizing’ story may say that it does, while noting that in this simple case 
evolution has settled for a hard-coded and very special-purpose approximation. 
My view, however, would be that the ants, if they are indeed using only this 
special-purpose proxy for self-estimated sensory uncertainty, are not fully-
fledged PP agents. Instead, they are the kinds of interesting mixed case one 
might expect to find in a wide range of simpler beings. They are equipped with 
core elements (forward models and error-based updating) of the predictive 
apparatus, but are not yet able to leverage their own acquired knowledge in an 
open-ended variety of different contexts using the kinds of flexible precision-
weighting apparatus found in higher animals (and implemented using a wide 
variety of resources including dopaminergic modulation and phase-locked 
neuronal oscillations). 
 
Does that put pressure on the claim that PP is a truly unifying story? I don’t 
think so. For as we saw earlier PP, unlike the full free energy story, does not 
claim to apply to every form of living being. Instead, PP describes a specific, 
powerful, and amazingly flexible mechanism that represents one solution to the 
more general problem of temporarily resisting (or rather, appearing temporarily 
to resist!) the second law of thermodynamics. Considered as a process theory 
of that type, it is unsurprising if it turns out that the evolutionary path to the 
full apparatus includes many stepping-stones, fragments, and outright 
alternatives. This is consistent with the idea that core principles underlying  life 
and mind involve the use of hard-coded or more flexible means of predicting 
the sensory flow, and (hence) that the free energy minimizing story helps us 
appreciate the continuity between basic life and advanced minds. If nothing 
else, the PP story thus invites us to ask new questions of nature, and may 
suggest new ways of gradually accumulating the resources that deliver general-
purpose problem solving and rich conscious experience of a structured world. 
 
What about the promised union between embodied cognition and PP? Is that 
threatened by the discovery, in ants (and perhaps sometimes in humans too) of 
special-purpose tricks that sidestep the need to estimate sensory uncertainty? 
This would be the case only, it seems to me, if it tuned out that humans always 
rely on special-purpose tricks rather than also benefitting from a general-
purpose trick  (variable precision-weighting) that enables us to make flexible 
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use of the vast body of acquired knowledge realized in our probabilistic 
generative model. Our remarkable capacity to at least appear to be general-
purpose problem-solvers may be rooted, it seems to me, in that key multi-
purpose trick: a trick that then gets amplified first by spoken language (which 
arguably provides an additional means of manipulating our own precision-
weighting apparatus – see Lupyan and Clark (2015)) and then again by the 
strategic use of social and material culture (see Roepstorff (2013), Roepstorff et 
al (2010)). 
 
Finally, notice that general-purpose and special-purpose tricks and ploys may 
then nest and iterate in complex and extremely powerful ways. With the general 
–purpose precision-weighting trick in place, new special-purpose tricks may be 
learnt and deployed wherever task and context allow. That kind of nesting 
could extend all the way to the learning and use of cheap proxies for our own 
self-estimated uncertainty! We might, that is to say, learn to use precision-
weighting variations to install transient patterns of influence that allow some 
simple quantity to stand in for more complex (though always merely 
approximate) online calculations of uncertainty whenever task and context 
permit. This would be just one more case in which the presence of rich inner 
resources is what enables an efficient embodied strategy to emerge and carry 
the load. Variable precision-weighting, channeled and directed by language, 
culture, and material scaffolding, may be what enables our own stunning 
combination of deep flexibility and efficient embodied problem-solving - the 
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1 From the list of aphorisms published at:  
http://www.cybsoc.org/ross.htm 
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2 Chalmers notes that I make just that move in Clark (2009a). But as he later notes, my 
strategy there is really to use this as a softener for the main claim, which is that external 
operations can be woven in via perception and action and yet constitute an extended 
cognitive circuit. 
 
3 The case is thus similar to that of the long-term couple discussed in a footnote to the 
original paper. 
 
4 These devices are also known as Neural Turing Machines – see Hassabis (2017) 
 
5 This picture was first mooted in a never-published paper co-authored with Jesse Prinz back 
in the early 90’s. That paper was entitled “The Absent Mind” and the core claim was that 
‘mind’ and ‘cognition’ were confusing and unstable terms that should play no role in a 
mature cognitive science.  
 
 
6 The quote is from R. Martin's  translation of his De Anima (Liber de anima seu sextus de 
naturalibus) vol 7 . 
 
 
7 Anderson and Chemero go on to discuss these issues in the context of some long-running 
debates concerning the implications of ‘Markov blanket’ organizations. I agree with most of 
their comments there, so won’t pursue that angle here (see Clark (2017)). 
 
8 In the traditional Scottish ballad “The Bonnie Banks o' Loch Lomond. 
 
9 Thanks to Matteo Colombo for suggesting this way of looking at the difference. 
 
10 This paper – perhaps more than any other in the volume – raises many more questions 
than I can attempt to answer here. So I have chosen to focus on just one core and contested 
issue, the question of whether we can fruitfully combine the PP picture with more 
‘ecological’ ones that stress frugal, efficient, non-reconstructive, modes of contact with the 
world. 
 
11 From a purely Bayesian perspective there is no difference between increasing the weight 
on prediction or decreasing the weight on (relevant) prediction error. But in the nervous 
system, these may well correspond to different manipulations, and the differences may 
matter, for the  differentiation and treatment of psychopathologies.  
 
12 To be mostly moving through highly predictable spaces is also plausibly seen, as Friston 
(this volume) argues, as a necessary condition for our own existence. Staying within such 
bounds is the signature achievement of organizational forms that appear to mount staunch if 
temporary resistance to the second law of thermodynamics. What is here at issue, though, is 
something subtly different – whether remaining within those bounds involves, for creatures 
like us, the constant down-flow of predictions of their own sensory flux. 
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13 Orlandi and Lee rightly distinguish ‘merely Bayesian’ stories from the PP process model. 
Still, it is clear from the outset that it is the gloss on PP as involving a characteristically “top-
down, expectation-driven” process that they are seeking to call into question. They do this 
both by emphasizing the potential for strongly bottom-up, relatively stimulus- driven 
processing in hierarchical Bayesian settings, and by suggesting (in their section 2 discussion 
of PP proper) that we are just combining estimates in a way that privileges neither 
processing direction. The flaw in this argument turns  (see text) upon a functional asymmetry 
at the core of PP– an asymmetry between the complex non-linear construction of 
downwards-flowing predictions and the much simpler forward-flowing accumulation of 
prediction errors calculated against that flow. 
 
14 Prinz himself does not work like this. He pursues topic after topic (emotions, concepts, 
consciousness) canvassing everything science, and sometimes art, has to offer on each 
individual front. Whose way is best? I don’t think we need to choose. My old friend and 
mentor the cybernetician Donald T. Campbell insisted that the collective scientific endeavor 
is best served by pursuing a variety of different but overlapping and inter-communicating 
ways of exploring mind and its place in nature. He called this the “overlapping fish-scales” 
model of science and philosophy.  
 
15 E.g. Seth (2013), Seth et al (2011), Barrett and Simmons (2015), Miller and Clark (2017).  
 
16 See http://www.x-spect.org/ 
	  
